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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980131-CA 
v. 
SHAWN P. SQUIRES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Court of 
Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's decision that the victim was 
unavailable under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(a)(5) is barred because the 
defendant has failed to provide a transcript of the February 10, 1998 hearing at which this 
decision was made. R. 117-18. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, the 
appellate court will presume the correctness of the proceedings below. State v. Wetzel. 
868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); State v. Snvder. 932 P.2d 120, 131 (Utah App. 1997). 
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2. Permitting the use of the victim's preliminary hearing testimony, as an 
unavailable witness, was not an abuse of discretion where the victim was a Mexican 
national that the Immigration and Naturalization Service would not allow to return to this 
country to testify. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's decision that a witness is 
unavailable and that the witness's prior testimony bears sufficient indicia of reliability is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 646 (Utah 
1995). 
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's Rule 
16(g) motion to prohibit the State of Utah from using Ron Lockwood's testimony based 
on an alleged discovery violation, where the state learned of Lockwood being a potential 
witness from the defense well after the discovery was sought and the state immediately 
informed the defense that it intended to call him as a witness. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A complaint that the trial court failed to order a 
requested remedy or that the remedy was insufficient to obviate the harm resulting from 
the violation is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994). 
4. Defendant's Exhibit #9 (Inmate Request for medical services) is inadmissable 
hearsay and the trial court's decision to exclude it was correct. 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A decision to exclude evidence offered under Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(3) or (6) will not be overturned unless it was an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1228 (Utah 1989); Klinger v. Kightlv. 889 
P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah App. 1995). 
5. Even if the trial court's exclusion of Defendant's Exhibit #9 were error, the 
defendant has failed to make his required showing that "the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict." State v. 
RammeL 721 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 1986). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On appeal, a trial court's erroneous exclusion of 
admissible evidence is harmful if there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, a 
different result would have occurred. State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989) (error must be substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there "is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there 
would have been a more favorable result for the defendant."). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16. Discovery 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
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(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has 
a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention 
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 
such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit 
the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order 
as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30(a). Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of 
declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional or physical condition. A statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but 
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of 
declarant's will. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it 
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, 
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record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances 
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and 
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in 
which the declarant: 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has 
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable 
means. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the 
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in 
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in 
interest, had an opportunity and similar m ~>tive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay. 
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part 
of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule 
provided in these rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an information dated and filed August 12, 1997, Shawn Patrick Squires was 
charged with Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree felony. R. 1-2. The victim was Ruben 
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Segura-Ayalla1, a citizen of Mexico. R. 162, at 12-19. Ayalla was present at the 
preliminary hearing held on August 26, 1997, and testified through an interpreter, id, R. 
11-12, and Squire's lawyer had the opportunity to cross-examine Ayalla. R. 162, at 17-
19. 
On December 31, 1997, The State of Utah filed a Notice of Unavailability of 
Witness and Motion, asserting that Ayalla had, since the preliminary hearing, returned to 
Mexico and that the State of Utah was unable to obtain his presence at the trial of this 
matter. R. 45-47. This Motion was denied by the trial court. R. 84-85. Instead, the trial 
was continued and the State was given more time in which to secure the presence of 
Ayalla at trial. 
On January 30, 1998, the State of Utah filed a further Notice of Declarant 
Unavailable Under Rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 104-5. In its notice, the state 
indicated that it had located Ayalla in Mexico, and was negotiating with the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to obtain permission for Ayalla to enter the 
United States for the purpose of testifying at the trial R. 105. Because permission from 
INS had not been obtained, the state sought a ruling that Ayalla was unavailable as a 
witness. Id. 
1
 In the record, Ruben Segura-Ayalla is referred to both as Ruben Segura and as 
Ruben Ayalla. 
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At a hearing held on February 10, 1998, the state submitted State's Exhibit #1 
(copies of two letters directed to INS) and the question of Ayalla's availability was 
presented and argued to the court.2 R. 117 and State's Exhibit #1. The trial court found 
that Ayala was an unavailable witness, and granted the state's motion to use his 
preliminary hearing testimony at the trial. R. 117. 
On February 12, 1998, Shawn Squires was found guilty, following a jury trial, of 
assault by a prisoner. R. 120-25, 146. Squires was sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison. R. 150-52. Squires filed the present 
appeal on March 2, 1998. R. 155-56. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On August 6, 1997, Shawn Squires and Ruben Segura-Ayalla were inmates at the 
Iron County Correctional Facility. R. 162 at 12-13; R. 166 at 56-58, 76-77, 140-41, 152. 
During a basketball game, an altercation arose as to whether Ayalla had fouled Squires. 
R. 162 at 13; R. 166 at 79-80, 153-54. 
After Squires and Ayalla had left the gym, Squires returned to his cell where he 
told his cellmate that he was going to go and fight Ayalla. R. 166 at 81-82. Squires 
approached Ayalla and led him into Ayalla's cell. R. 162 at 13; R. 166 at 58-59. 
Once in Ayalla's cell, Ayalla could see that Squires was mad. R. 162 at 13. 
Ayalla tried to leave the cell but Squires stopped him. Id; R. 166 at 60, 84. Squires then 
2
 No transcript of this hearing has been made part of the record. 
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began hitting Ayalla. R. 162 at 13; R. 166 at 60-61, 84. Ayalla did not fight back, but 
only sought to protect himself by blocking Squires' blows. R. 162 at 14; R. 166 at 84-85. 
During the assault, Ayalla suffered abrasions and a cut to one of his ears. R. 162 at 14-
15; R. 166 at 40; 61, 85, 155. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Shawn Squires' only challenge to the use of the videotaped testimony of the victim 
at his trial is that he claims the trial court erred in determining that the victim was 
unavailable under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This issue was addressed at a 
hearing, the transcript of which has not been made a part of the record. In the absence of 
an adequate record, this Court should presume the correctness of the proceedings below 
and reject this challenge. Further, the applicable portions of the record that we do have 
demonstrate that the victim was unavailable because INS would not permit him to reenter 
the country for the purpose of testifying. 
The defendant subpoenaed Ron Lockwood as a potential witness for his trial. In 
learning of this, the prosecutor investigated what information Lockwood might have 
concerning the assault perpetrated by Shawn Squires. As soon as the prosecutor learned 
the significance of Lockwood's testimony, from the defendant, he informed the defendant 
of the State of Utah's intent to call Lockwood. The state did not violate its discovery 
duties by not listing a potential witness of which it had no knowledge at the time it 
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responded to discovery. The witness' name was revealed to the defendant as soon as it 
was learned by the state. 
The trial court correctly excluded Defendant's Exhibit #9 (Inmate Request) as 
hearsay. It does not meet the requirements for either of the two exceptions argued by the 
defendant in the trial court, and the defendant cannot raise a third possible exception to 
the hearsay rule for the first time on appeal. Even if Exhibit #9 was improperly excluded, 
the defendant has failed to make the necessary showing that, absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a different result would have occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE VICTIM WAS 
UNAVAILABLE TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL 
The victim, Ruben Segura-Ayalla, is a Mexican national. After the preliminary 
hearing in this matter, and before the trial, Ayalla left the United States and returned to 
Mexico. Squires does not challenge the reliability of Ayalla's preliminary hearing 
testimony. Squires does not challenge the fact that his attorney had the opportunity to 
cross-examine Ayalla at the preliminary hearing. The sole challenge to the trial court's 
decision to permit the use of Ayalla's preliminary hearing testimony is Squire's claim that 
Ayalla was not unavailable because the state should have made "appropriate 
arrangements" with INS to insure Ayalla's return. Brief of Appellant at 7. Squires has 
failed to make a transcript of the hearing at which the trial court determined that Ayalla 
9 
was unavailable a part of the record. Further, the the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that the state had made a good faith effort to obtain the attendance of 
Ayalla at trial. 
A. In the Absence of an Adequate Record, the Proceedings Below Will be 
Presumed to Have Been Correct 
While Shawn Squires challenges the correctness of the trial court's ruling that 
Ayalla was an unavailable witness, Squires has not provided a transcript of the hearing in 
which this decision was made. The minute entry shows that State Exhibit #1 (copies of 
correspondence between the Iron County Attorney's Office and INS seeking permission 
for Ayalla to return to Utah to testify) was entered and argument and statements were 
made. R. 117. But the actual information, other than State Exhibit #1, that was presented 
to the trial court is unknown because no transcript of the hearing has been made a part of 
the record. Defendant asks this Court to overturn the trial court's discretionary decision 
without providing this Court an adequate record of the pertinent proceedings. 
"In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this Court can only assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below." State v. WetzeL 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). In 
State v. Snvder. 932 P.2d 120, 131 (Utah App. 1997), this Court rejected a challenge to 
the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress where the defendant had failed to include a 
transcript of the hearing on the motion in the record. This Court held that, absent a 
transcript of the hearing, it would assume that the trial court had acted appropriately. 
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Without a transcript of the hearing on whether Ayalla was unavailable to testify at 
trial, this Court should assume the correctness of the trial court's decision that he was 
unavailable. Otherwise, this Court would have to review the trial court's decision without 
the benefit of knowing exactly what information was presented to the court below in 
support of the motion. Especially in a factually intensive matter of this nature, defendant 
cannot claim error and seek appellate review without fulfilling his duty and responsibility 
to support his allegations with an adequate record. State v. Weitzel 868 P.2d at 67. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Found That Ayalla was Unavailable to Testify. 
The defendant's only challenge to the use of Ayalla's preliminary hearing 
testimony is that the State of Utah had not shown Ayalla to be unavailable. "A witness is 
unavailable under Utah law if a good faith effort was made to secure the witness's 
presence at trial." State v. Carter. 888 P.2d 629, 646 (Utah 1995). The state located 
Ayalla in Mexico. Ayalla was contacted through his family, and indicated that he was 
willing to return to testify. Iron County stood ready to pick up Ayalla at the border, bring 
him to Utah for the trial, and return him to the Mexican border after the trial. State 
Exhibit # 1. The only obstacle that prevented his return was that the INS would not 
permit him to enter the country. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that Ayalla was unavailable. 
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Defendant claims that the state should not have permitted the deportation3 of 
Ayalla without exacting a commitment from the federal government that they would 
permit his return to testify. Defendant is silent as to what authority the State of Utah 
would have used in stopping INS from taking such action. It would have been 
unreasonable to incarcerate Ayalla in a state institution until such time as the trial could 
be commenced. U.S. v. Eufracio-Torres. 890 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1989) ("We agree 
fully with the trial court, and further observe that confining witnesses to give the jury the 
opportunity to personally hear them testify in Spanish and observe them as they testify 
would be unreasonable."). 
In Eufracio-Torres. the defendant was charged with illegally transporting aliens. 
Instead of incarcerating the illegal aliens until the criminal trial, their depositions were 
taken and they were permitted to leave the country. Each was given a subpoena and was 
instructed on how they could return to this country for trial, though none did. The Court 
held that the illegal aliens were unavailable and affirmed the use of their depositions in 
the criminal trial. The only difference between Eufracio-Torres and the current action is 
that the State of Utah was not able to convince the federal government to permit the 
return of Ayalla. 
3
 Though the record doesn't affirmatively show whether Ayalla was deported or 
voluntarily left the United States. 
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The state did all that was in its power to obtain the return of Ay alia for trial. This 
situation is not like either State v. Case. 752 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1987) or State v. 
Chapman. 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982). In those actions, the state failed to take advantage 
of an existing mechanism that could have secured the attendance of the missing 
witnesses. In this action, the state showed that it was "practically impossible to produce 
the witness in court." State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Carter. 888 P.2d at 646. All steps were taken to obtain the presence of Ayalla. It was 
only the intransigence of the INS that made all of the state's efforts futile. Given the 
good faith efforts of the state, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in finding that 
Ayalla was unavailable. 
Indeed, if any error was made in permitting Ayalla to be deported, Squires has 
waived any claim based thereon. Squires did not challenge the release of Ayalla in any 
manner. He did not seek an order of the court, as did the defendant in Eufracio-Torres. 
preventing the release of the alien witness. In United States v. Santos-Pinon. 146 F.3d 
734, 736 (9th Cir. 1998), the Court held that such a claim was waived when it was not 
brought before the alien witness's release. "Allowing Santos-Pinon to preserve his 
objection to the release of the witnesses until after they are released would place the 
government in the impossible position of being faced with an objection once it is too late 
to take any necessary corrective action." 
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II. SQUIRES HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY 
PREJUDICIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATION 
Squires objected, pursuant to Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
to the intent of the state to call Ron Lockwood as a witness at trial. R. 166 at 20-21. The 
objection was solely based on the claim that the state had failed to list Lockwood as a 
potential witness in its responses to discovery that had been filed on November 14, 1997. 
R. 28-30. David Brickey, the state's attorney, explained that the state was not aware of 
Ron Lockwood as a potential witness at the time that the responses to discovery were 
filed. After the evidentiary hearing (on the defendant's motion to suppress and that 
Ayalla be declared unavailable) on Tuesday, February 10,1998, Mr. Brickey looked over 
the court file in this case. R. 166 at 22. In doing so, he found that the defendant had 
subpoenaed Ron Lockwood as a potential witness for the original trial date of January 7, 
1998 in this matter. Id.. This led Mr. Brickey to inquire of the Iron County Correctional 
Facility as to why Lockwood might have pertinent information. Late that night, Mr. 
Brickey received by fax a report that convinced him that Lockwood should be called as a 
witness. Id. Mr. Brickey informed Squires' attorney by fax and hand delivery the next 
day that the State of Utah would be calling Lockwood as a witness. R. 166 at 21-22. 
The trial court denied the objection, stating: "Where the defense has known of this 
witness and at least potentially part of his testimony to the point they were subpoenaing 
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him themselves I'm going to allow him to testify." R. 166 at 22. Squires did not seek a 
continuance to prepare to meet Lockwood's testimony. 
"Rule 16(g) grants a trial court ample discretion to remedy any prejudice to a party 
resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules." State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 
418 (Utah 1989). But the defendant has failed to demonstrate that any breach of the 
discovery rules has taken place. The undisputed evidence was that the state was unaware 
of Ron Lockwood as a potential witness at the time it filed its discovery responses. There 
is no claim that the state withheld information in its discovery responses. 
Instead, the state learned that Ron Lockwood was a potential witness from the fact 
that he had been subpoenaed as such by the defendant almost three months after it had 
filed its responses to discovery. As soon as the decision had been made that Lockwood 
would be called as a witness, that information was provided, along with a copy of the 
pertinent report, to the defendant's counsel. The trial court correctly denied the 
defendant's objection because no discovery violation had been shown. 
Further, the defendant has failed to demonstrate any hcirm that resulted from the 
trial court's permitting Lockwood to testify. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting the state to call a witness that the defense was already aware of, indeed had 
subpoenaed. The defendant has not shown that he suffered any prejudice from Ron 
Lockwood being allowed to testify. State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 401 (Utah 1994) 
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("The trial court's discretion is not abused unless prejudice sufficient to result in a 
reversal of the conviction occurred due to the discovery violation."). 
Other than stating that a continuance was "unrealistic" because Squires was 
incarcerated (Brief of Appellant at 8), defendant has failed to identify in what manner he 
was prejudiced by the fact that a witness that he had subpoenaed to testify was permitted 
to testify. There is no claim that he was surprised by the testimony given by Ron 
Lockwood or that he was unprepared to meet that testimony. The trial court did not 
abuses its discretion in permitting the state to call Lockwood as a witness under these 
circumstances. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT #9 
The evening after the assault, Shawn Squires filled out an "Inmate Request" form, 
asking to be seen by medical staff. In filling out the form, Squires claimed that he had a 
broken nose and a bruise on the side of his head. Defendant's Exhibit #9. In the trial 
court, defendant sought the admission of this form under Rule 803(3) and (6) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence.4 The trial court excluded the exhibit as impermissible hearsay. R. 
166 at 129-34. 
4
 Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant also claims that this exhibit should 
have been allowed under 803(4) as well (Brief of Appellant at 10, n.l). This Court 
should not consider this new argument that has been raised for the first time on appeal. 
Espinal v. Salt Lake Citv Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
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Because the written statement of the defendant is hearsay within hearsay, under 
Rule 805 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court properly rejected the application 
of the business record exception to the hearsay rule. The court was also correct in 
determining that the proffered exhibit did not qualify under the presence sense impression 
exception to the rule. 
Even if the trial court's decision had been an abuse of discretion, this Court should 
still affirm the defendant's conviction. Squires has failed to make the requisite showing 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that a different outcome would have occurred but for 
the alleged error. While claiming that the excluded exhibit was relevant, Squires has 
failed to demonstrate, or even allege, that its admission would have led to a more 
favorable result. 
A. Defendant's Exhibit #9 Is Impermissible Hearsay Within Hearsay. 
Squires first claimed that the Inmate Request Form that he had filled out the night 
after the assault was admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has held that witnesses' 
statements contained within a police report were not admissible under the business 
records exception. State v. BertuL 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983). Though this 
decision was reached under the prior rules of evidence, it is consistent with the decisions 
of the federal courts under their business records exception which is identical to the 
current Utah rule. 
17 
In United States v. Ismoila. 100 F.3d 380, 392 (5th Cir. 1997), the Court held that 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule only applied to information in a 
business record when the source of that information, and the recorder of the information, 
are employees of the institution, acting in the regular course of their business. The Court 
expressly held that the exception did not apply when the source of the information was an 
outsider. "The outsider's statement must fall within another hearsay exception to be 
admissible because it does not have the presumption of accuracy that statements made 
during the regular course of business have." Id. 
In United States v. Snvder. 787 F.2d 1429, 1433-34 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held 
that statements by inmates found in a prison business record were not admissible under 
this exception to the hearsay rule. "They were mere bystanders, obviously not acting in 
the regular course of business, and their statements as recorded by Officer Mowery 
cannot be given the presumption of reliability and regularity accorded a business record." 
14 
Shawn Squires was not acting in the regular course of business in filling out 
Defendant's Exhibit #9. He was an outsider and not an employee of the Iron County 
Correctional Facility. For these reasons, even though the document may be maintained 
by the Correctional Facility in the normal course of business, the portions written on the 
document by the defendant constitute hearsay within hearsay and the trial court correctly 
so held. 
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B. Defendant's Exhibit #9 Was Properly Excluded Under Rule 803(3). 
Defendant's Exhibit #9 does not meet the standard for being admitted under the 
then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition exception to the hearsay rule. It 
was not offered to show the state of mind, emotions, or physical condition of the plaintiff 
the night after the assault. Statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered 
or believed are not permissible under Rule 803(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This 
exhibit was offered for the truth of Shawn Squires claim that he was injured in the 
struggle with Ruben Segura-Ayalla. Appellant's Brief at 10. It contained the 
impermissible statement of belief, by Squires, that his nose was broken and it was offered 
to prove the fact believed. As such it was not admissible. 
Further, the exhibit lacks the required indicia of reliability under the rule. 
Evidence was presented that Squires, shortly after the assault,was seeking to coerce 
favorable testimony from potential witnesses. Defendant's Exhibit 5; R. 166 at 65-66, 
68-69. Squires' self-serving claim that his nose was broken was properly excluded from 
evidence, 
C. No Showing Has Been Made That the Excluded Evidence Would Probably Have 
Had a Substantial Influence in Bringing About a Different Verdict. 
The defendant has made no claim that the exclusion of Defendant's Exhibit #9 
violated any constitutional right of the defendant. "In instances where an error does not 
impact a federal constitutional right, the test used for determining an error's harmfulness 
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is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error a different result would 
have occurred. State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (footnote omitted). This 
determination is made by reviewing the record as a whole. 
The defendant made a proper proffer of evidence as to this Exhibit (R. 166 at 134-
35), but has made no effort to prove that the excluded evidence "would probably have had 
a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict." State v. Rammel 721 P.2d 
498, 500 (Utah 1986). No effort has been made by the defendant to demonstrate that the 
alleged erroneous exclusion of this exhibit has substantially and prejudicially affected the 
defendant's substantial rights. Rule 30(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. 
Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989). Instead, the defendant appears to argue that 
the alleged error itself, without any need for a further showing, merits reversal. 
The evidence presented in the Statement of Relevant Facts shows that Squires; 
approached Ay alia, went with Ay alia into Ay alia's cell, kept Ay alia from leaving when 
he sought to do so, and repeatedly struck Ayalla. While Squires did not testify, he did 
present witnesses who testified that: Ayalla struck the first blew and had Squires in a 
headlock (R. 166 at 142); that Squires was injured (his face was red - R. 166 at 155). 
Defendant has not shown tha this exhibit was significant, non-cumulative, or that 
its admission would have likely led to a more favorable verdict. Considering the entirety 
of the record, defendant cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
admission of Defendant's Exhibit #9 would have led to a more favorable result. For this 
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reason, even if the exclusion of this evidence was erroneous, it was harmless error and the 
conviction of the defendant should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the State of Utah urges this Court to affirm the 
conviction of the defendant. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION 
NOT REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
The State of Utah does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this 
matter. The questions raised in this appeal are not such that oral argument or a published 
opinion are necessary, though the State of Utah desires to participate in oral argument if 
such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this </,/ day of December, 1998. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee State of Utah, postage prepaid, to the following on this the z,J day of 
December, 1998: 
Floyd W. Holm 
141 North Main, Suite 220 
P. O. Box 220 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-2855 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
^ 
22 
ADDENDUM "A 
SCOTT M BURNS 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Fax:(801)586-2737 
DAVID R. BRICKEY, CHIEF DEPUTY KARLA STAHEU, DEPUTY 
January 16,1998 
Meryl E. Rogers, Officer In Charge 
I.N.S. 
5272 South College Drive, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
RE: Ruben Segura-Avala. File No. A76632472 
Dear Mr. Rogers: 
I am writing to you in an effort to obtain permission from I.N.S. in a securing permission to 
allow Ruben Segura-Ayala to return to the United States and testify in a criminal matter that I am 
prosecuting. It is necessary to provide you some additional information regarding Mr: Segura-Ayala 
so that you may understand why I think it important that he testify at a felony trial here in Iron 
County. 
On July 21,1997, Ruben Segura-Ayala plead guilty to several criminal charges here in Iron 
County. I was the prosecuting attorney. One of the reasons I insisted on him pleading guilty on all 
of the charges was that he was in fact an illegal immigrant and that I wanted him to return to Mexico. 
After Mr. Segura-Ayala entered his guilty plea he was returned to the Iron County Correctional 
Facility where he was to be housed until he was transported back to Mexico. 
On or about August 6, 1997, Ruben Segura-Ayala was the victim of a vicious attack by 
another inmate, by the name of Shawn Patrick Squires. The attack committed by Mr. Squires 
resulted in Mr. Segura-Ayala having go to a hospital for significant medical treatment. Since this 
assault occurred after Mr. Segura-Ayala's sentencing the decision was to allow I.N.S. to transport 
Mr. Segura-Ayala back to Mexico. I had obtained Mr, Segura-Ayala's statement in a written format 
at the time of his visit to the hospital. I had hoped to use it at any future trial. 
Additionally, I thought that there were sutficient witnesses present in the jail to testify against 
Mr. Squires. Mr. Squires is currently serving a one (1) year term of imprisonment for a felony 
conviction. I have since acquired information that Mr. Squires knew he was assaulting a Mexicar 
national. Mr. Squires planned on the victim being transported out of the United States. 
(r>(r 
Meryl E. Rogers 
January 16,1998 
Page 2 
It is also for this reason that the Defendant Shawn Patrick Squires, has been refusing to plead to any 
type of misconduct. 
It is both my desire and Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns desire to allow Ruben Segura-
Ayala to return to the United States and testify against Shawn Patrick Squires so that I may 
justifiably ask for a prison commitment. The trial is presently scheduled for February 12,1998, in 
Cedar City, Utah. 
I have discussed this matter with Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, and he has authorized 
me to arrange for an officer to go to a point of entry to pick up Mr. Segura-Ayala and return him to 
Iron County and then once his testimony has been provided to a jury, return him to Mexico. 
Additionally, Mr. Segura-Ayala does have family who resides in Iron County as legal immigrants. 
I have consulted with them and asked whether or not they can communicate with Ruben Segura-
Ayala and whether or not he would be willing to return to the United States for the purposes of 
testifying against Shawn Patrick Squires. They have indicated that he is willing to return to testify. 
If you should have any questions regarding the content of this letter or the reasons for our desire to 
have Mr. Segura present, please contact me at the Iron County Attorney's Office. 
Sincerely, 
David R. Brickey / 
Chief Deputy Iron bounty Attorney 
DRB:slw 
p.c. Scott M. Burns 
Ed Tolbert, Agent with I.N.S. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 Fax: (435) 586-2737 
DAVID R. BRICKEY, CHIEF DEPUTY KARLA STAHELI, DEPUTY 
January 23,1998 
San Diego District Office, Officer In Charge 
INS 
880 Front Street 
San Diego, California, 92188 
RE: Ruben Segura-Ayala. File No. A76632472 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
I initially contacted the INS office located in Salt Lake City, Utah in reference to obtaining 
permission in allowing a Mexican National to return to the United States to testify in a criminal 
matter that I am prosecuting. Please find enclosed a copy of the letter dated January 16, 1998, and 
addressed to Meryl E. Rogers, Officer In Charge, Recently, I have been contacted by Wayne 
Kirtpatrick who indicated that the request must initially come from the Defendant's.point of entry. 
I have learned that in fact Ruben Segura-Ayala, if permitted to return to the United States, would like 
to pass through the point of entry nearest Tijuana, Mexico. 
As indicated in my letter dated January 16, 1998, it is critical that I have the testimony of 
Ruben Segura-Ayala at the February 12,1998, trial against Shawn Patrick Squires. I am requesting 
that you please consider allowing Mr. Segura-Ayala return to the United States to testify. I have 
confiiiaud with my boss, Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, that we would arrange for the 
transportation both from the point of entry to Iron County and return back to the point of entry Mr. 
Segura-Ayala following the conclusion of the trial. Your assistance in answering my request would 
be greatly appreciated. If you should have any questions regarding the content or the nature of my 
request, please contact me at the Iron County Attorney's Office. 
Sincerely 
©avid R. Brickey* 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
DRB:slw 
p.c. Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney // v / / Y - ! O ) v-v 
Wayne Kirtpatrick, Agent with INS : _ > \,_Jj \ \ ' \ 
Ed Tolbert, Agent with INS U 
The following is a statement taken at the Valley View Medical Center on August 6, 1997 from 
inmate Ruben Segura Ayala #12251. This statement was given in Spanish to Iron County 
employee, Lindy Means, who then translated the following summary. Those present at the time 
of the statement were Lindy Means, Jim Stewart, and the medical Doctor who was caring for his 
wounds. 
The following is written in first person a? if Inmate Ayala were writing it: 
I was playing basketball in the gym with the other inmates. While playing the game I was 
trying to get the ball away from the other inmate when I slapped his hand without any bad intention 
but to get the ball. The other inmate got mad at me and pushed me saying he wanted to fight. I said, 
"no, I don't want to fight." I didn't foul him intentionally. Basketball isn't really my strong sport, 
I really like soccer. After returning to the block, approximately 15 minutes later, I was sitting at the 
table with a friend. I was telling the friend how I didn't want to fight with him because I want to get 
out as soon as possible. I didn't do it on purpose! This other inmate, I don't know his name, came 
to the table and asked if he could talk to me. I thought he just wanted to resolve the 
misunderstanding by talking, so I got up and walked into my cell. When I turned around, he was 
behind me and I realized he didn't want to talk, he only wanted to fight. I tried to leave my cell and 
he stopped me from leaving while he shut the cell door and started hitting on me. I instinctively tried 
to defend myself at first but then I laid down on the bed and he continued to hit me. When the mad 
inmate left my cell, I called for help on the intercom. 
The inmate that did this to me has reddish/blond short hair, a little curly on top. There was 
not anyone else involved in this fight. I can identify him to file charges. 
SPANISH VERSION: 
Yo estaba jugando balencesto con los otros residentes en el gimnasio. Mientras jugando yo 
estaba con la intencion de conseguir el peloto cuando yo dio una palmada encima de su brazo o mano. 
Ese chico, se enfado conmigo, me empujo y queria pelear conmigo. Yo dijo que no queria pelear con 
el. No lo hizo con malos intenciones. Yo no me gusta el balencesto mucho, no lo juego bien como 
el soccer! Al regresar al bloque, entre como quince (15) minutos, yo estaba sentada a la mesa con 
Jeremy hablando sobre todo. Yo le dije que no quero tener problemas con nadie, solo quero hacer 
mi tiempo y volver a mi familia. Ese otro residente que se enfado en el gimnasio me acerco, me pidio 
hablar con el solos. Me levante de la mesa y se fue a mi cuarto para hablar con el solo. Cuando 
entramos al cuarto y yo vio que el no queria hablar pero queria pelear, yo intente salir y no me dejo. 
El cerro la puerta y empezo pegarme fiiertamente. En el principio, yo instintivamente empezar 
defender mi mismo, pero en fin yo le dejo pegarme mientras yo estaba encima de la cama. Cuando 
ese residente enfadado se fue de mi cuarto, yo llamo a la guardia ayudarme con atencion medico. 
Yo no se el nombre de ese residente pero tiene pelo corto, rojo/rubio, y un poco rizado por 
encima. No habia otro residentes incluidos en nada. Yo puedo identificarle por visto. 
